

are in prison for political crimes, mostly for having sought to peacefully express opinions of which the regime did not approve. In a country where one in three children is malnourished, the generals recently agreed to buy from Russia a dozen advanced MiG-29 fighter jets.

The combined effect of repression and the military's incompetence is ever-worsening poverty. In the past year, the local currency has lost half its value. The only export on an upward curve is heroin. Vast acreages of rain forest have been destroyed to feed the generals' corruption. Just in the past two months, the BBC recently reported, food prices have doubled, and power outages have become routine. HIV-AIDS is spreading fast.

Despite democracy's advances around the world in recent years, the Burmese assuredly are not the only people still enchained. North Koreans, Chinese, Belarusians, Iraqis, Cubans—all are denied their freedoms, yet none is about to be liberated by U.S. bombing. There's a limit to what we can do, and what we should do.

Yet in all of those places the United States can and should press for freedom. In Burma, economic sanctions are beginning to have some effect. Concerned about their image and the economy, the generals have released some 200 political prisoners and at least entertained the efforts of a U.N. envoy, now on his sixth trip to the nation. If other countries remain steadfast in supporting Aung San Suu Kyi—refusing to provide aid, for example, except in consultation with her—there's some hope for more progress.

Burma, after all, would require no nation-building, no Bonn conferences, no search for a viable opposition. A qualified and democratically elected leader waits quietly in her lakefront Rangoon house, still committed after a decade to human rights and non-violent change. When she finally moves to the prime minister's office that belongs to her, and the Burmese people cheer their liberation as many Afghans have been cheering theirs, it would be nice if we could say at least: We're not surprised. We knew that terrible things were happening. We were with you all along.

ANDEAN TRADE PREFERENCE ACT

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. President, the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) expired yesterday. Signed into law in 1991 by the former President Bush, this Act established a unique approach to combating the War on Drugs in Latin America. Rather than assisting Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru solely through military assistance or direct financial aid, the supporters of ATPA sought to reduce drug trafficking through economic expansion. It was believed that increased trade would promote healthy economies, diversify export bases, and create jobs outside of the drug trade. Unlike other forms of aid, the expansion of free trade benefits everyone. American consumers benefit from a wider variety of lower-priced goods, while the citizens of Andean nations benefit from the creation of legitimate jobs outside of the drug trade.

Since the enactment of ATPA, positive changes have occurred within the region. Two-way trade between the United States and the Andean nations has doubled. Bolivia succeeded in eradicating 95% of its coca plantations.

Recently, Peru experienced a peaceful democratic transition from autocratic rule. In Colombia alone, ATPA helped to create over 140,000 new jobs. Today, farmers in the region are choosing to plant coffee beans, asparagus, and flowers instead of coca. With the expiration of ATPA, these successes are now in jeopardy.

While our nation remains engaged in a battle against terrorism, we must not lose sight of the critical security risks that remain not far beyond our borders. The Andean region is not only the world's primary source of coca, it is also a haven for terrorism and terrorist groups that thrive on funding derived from the drug trade. I am a staunch supporter of our war efforts, but I am also fearful of the consequences of neglecting this troubled region within our own hemisphere.

We are now at a critical juncture. Failing to extend ATPA sends a message to terrorist groups, drug traffickers, and counter-revolutionaries, that the United States is no longer committed to the region, and this inaction could impact our national security. Terrorism lurks in abandoned and hopeless regions, where good people resort to such measures out of desperation. As our nation's attention focuses on the war effort, we must not allow ourselves to neglect regions that still need our support and attention.

In March, Senator GRAHAM introduced S. 525, the Andean Trade Preference Expansion Act, of which I am a proud co-sponsor. That bill would expand and extend the current act, with the hope of furthering economic development and stability in the region. Unfortunately, that bill has yet to be debated on the Senate floor. While the Senate remains mired in partisan squabbling, the House of Representatives successfully passed a good bill on November 16 to extend and to expand ATPA. The expiration of ATPA should be a concern of all of us. I hope that the Majority leader will expeditiously move to schedule floor time for the consideration of an expansion of this important legislation before the fragile economies of the Andean region are left to falter.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR SUPPRESSION OF FINANCING TERRORISM

Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed in Executive Session to the consideration of Executive Calendar No. 2, International Convention for Suppression of Financing Terrorism; that the treaty be considered as having advanced to its parliamentary status up to and including the presentation of resolution of ratification, and that the reservation, understandings, and conditions be agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution of ratification is as follows:

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR SUPPRESSION OF FINANCING TERRORISM (TREATY DOC. 106-49)

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein).

SECTION 1. ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, SUBJECT TO A RESERVATION, UNDERSTANDINGS, AND CONDITIONS.

The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1999, and signed on behalf of the United States of America on January 10, 2000 (Treaty Document 106-49; in this resolution referred to as the "Convention"), subject to the reservation in section 2, the understandings in section 3, and the conditions in section 4.

SEC. 2. RESERVATION.

The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the reservation, which shall be included in the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention, that

(a) pursuant to Article 24(2) of the Convention, the United States of America declares that it does not consider itself bound by Article 24(1) of the Convention; and

(b) the United States of America reserves the right specifically to agree in a particular case to follow the arbitration procedure set forth in Article 24(1) of the Convention or any other procedure for arbitration.

SEC. 3. UNDERSTANDINGS.

The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following understandings, which shall be included in the United States instrument of ratification of the Convention:

(1) EXCLUSION OF LEGITIMATE ACTIVITIES AGAINST LAWFUL TARGETS.—The United States of America understands that nothing in the Convention precludes any State Party to the Convention from conducting any legitimate activity against any lawful target in accordance with the law of armed conflict.

(2) MEANING OF THE TERM "ARMED CONFLICT".—The United States of America understands that the term "armed conflict" in Article 2(1)(b) of the Convention does not include internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature.

SEC. 4. CONDITIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following conditions:

(1) TREATY INTERPRETATION.—The Senate reaffirms condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 19, 1990 (adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996), approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997 (relating to condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988).

(2) PROHIBITION ON EXTRADITION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT.—The United States shall not transfer any person, or consent to the transfer of any person extradited by the United States, to the International Criminal Court established by the Statute adopted in Rome, Italy, on July 17, 1998 unless the Rome Statute has entered into force for the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as required by Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution.

(3) SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION.—Nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes the enactment of legislation or the